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ON PROSECUTING PRESIDENTS
Akhil Reed Amar*
In 1996, my student Brian Kalt and I co-authored an article ex-
plaining that a sitting President is constitutionally immune from ordi-
nary criminal prosecution-state or federal-but is of course subject to
ordinary prosecution the instant he leaves office,' a prospect that can
obviously be hastened by impeachment.2 In this Essay, I shall summa-
rize my reasons for continuing to believe this.
The issue, as I understand it, concerns not Bill Clinton the man, but
the institution of the Presidency. The rules laid down by the Framers
apply equally to Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives.
I never asked Brian Kalt about his party affiliation, and we drafted our
article before the 1996 elections, not knowing who would be President
thereafter, and not knowing when this momentous question would next
be on the national agenda. In analyzing this and other constitutional
questions, I often try to reverse existing partisan polarities in my mind
so as to arrive at a result and a reasoning process untinged by current
political preference: I would invite the Senators and the Administration
to do the same thing. Constitutional law should not be partisan.
The position Brian and I put forth-that a sitting President claim-
ing the full privileges of his office may only be criminally tried by this
"court," the Senate, sitting in impeachment, and can be criminally tried
elsewhere only after he has left office 3-has a very distinguished, and
bipartisan, pedigree. It is the position put forth, in passing, in two Fed-
eralist Papers, Numbers 694 and 77.5 It is the position clearly taken by
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1. See Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution,
2 NExus 11, 11 (1997).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (stating explicitly that impeachment and removal do not
preclude ordinary criminal "Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment").
3. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 1, at 19.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 232 (Alexander Hamilton) (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds.,
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both John Adams6 and Thomas Jefferson-men who disagreed about
many other things, who both risked their lives to fight against monar-
chy, and who both believed deeply in the rule of law. It is the position
clearly set forth in the First Congress by Senator Oliver Ellsworth-a
Philadelphia Framer, the author of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and later
the Chief Justice of the United States.! It is the position that makes the
most sense of the analysis of the great Justice Joseph Story in his land-
mark 1833 treatise on the Constitution.9 It is the position articulated in
the Supreme Court as early as 1867 by Attorney General Stanbery,0 and
1983) (supporting the idea that a sitting President was not subject to criminal prosecution, and
writing that a President shall be "liable to be impeached, tried .... and removed from office; and
would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law")
(emphasis added).
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 284, 289 (Alexander Hamilton) (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al.
eds., 1983) (noting that the President would be liable to impeachment, removal, and "subsequent"
criminal punishment) (emphasis added).
6. See 9 THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES 168
(Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988) [hereinafter MAcLAY DIARY] (reporting that
then Vice President Adams, when asked the question whether a sitting President could commit
"[m]urder in [the] [s]treets" and remain free, answered: "Why [w]hen he is no longer President,
[y]ou can indict him.").
7. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Aaron Burr trial (June 20, 1807),
in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905), quoted in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 n.31 (1982). Jefferson stated:
The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature, ex-
ecutive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary.
But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the com-
mands of the latter, [and] to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could
bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south [and]
east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of
the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the others, is further mani-
fested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force
attempted on them by the others, and to none has it given more effectual or diversified
means than to the executive.
Id.
8. Ellsworth here was agreeing with John Adams, in a conversation recorded by Senator
William Maclay and quoted in the MACLAY DIARY, supra note 6, at 168.
9. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 814, at 579 (1833). Justice Story believed:
[T]here are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are
necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among
these must necessarily be included the power to perform them .... The president can-
not, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the dis-
charge of his duties of his office.
Id.
10. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARv. L. REV. 701, 717 n.63 (1994). Attorney General Stanbery
argued that a President "'is above the process of any court to bring him to account as President,"'
for so long as they remain President. Id. Once a President leaves office (because of impeachment
and removal, or otherwise) "'he no longer stands as the representative of the government,"' and
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the traditional position of the Justice Department." It is the position
taken twenty-five years ago, when Richard Nixon was President, by two
of my own teachers at Yale Law School, Robert Bork12 and Charles
Black. 3 In the symposium in which the Amar-Kalt article appeared, our
views were largely in sync with those of most of the other participants,
including my distinguished friend Terry Eastland. 4
Apart from these points about history and tradition, my basic con-
stitutional argument is more structural than textual, sounding in both
separation of powers and federalism. Other impeachable officers-Vice
Presidents, Cabinet officers, judges, and justices-may be indicted
while in office. But the Presidency is constitutionally unique-in the
President the entirety of the power of a branch of government is
vested. 5 And so the language of impeachment in the Constitution sen-
sibly means something slightly different as applied to Presidents on the
one hand, and other officials on the other. An analogy: The Constitution
gives the Senate the power of Advice and Consent, as to both Cabinet
then can be prosecuted "'for any wrong he has done to any individual, for any murder or any crime
of any sort which he has committed as President.' Id.
11. The opinion of the Justice Department was set forth by then Solicitor General Robert
Bork in response to Vice President Spiro Agnew's argument that both he and the President were
immune from criminal prosecution. The Justice Department argued that the President was immune,
but the Vice President was not. See Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice
President's Claim of Constitutional Immunity, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled Dec.
5, 1972 (D. Md. 1973), reprinted in N.Y. Tirs, Oct. 6, 1973, at 9.
12. See JoHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 140-41 (1996) (detailing Robert
Bork's argument that the President "could not be indicted prior to being impeached").
13. See CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHmENT: A HANDBOOK 40 (1974). Professor Black
argues:
[Ain incumbent president cannot be put on trial in the ordinary courts for ordinary
crime, and if the crime he is charged with is not an impeachable offense, the simple and
obvious solution would be either to indict him and delay trial until after his term has
expired, or to delay indictment until after his term, [with the statute of limitations]
"tolled"... until the president's term is over.
Id.
14. See Terry Eastland, The Power to Control Prosecution, 2 NExus 43, 49 (1997) (detailing
his view "that the President may be prosecuted, but that the President may be prosecuted only to
the extent he allows himself to be").
15. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.") (emphasis added)); Eastland, supra note 14, at 46 ("No single consti-
tutional officer has so much power as the President, none must be on the job so continuously-
administration of the laws and the handling of foreign affairs requires that the presidency be open
24 hours a day-and for no other officer does the Constitution take such care to ensure a successor
in the event of his removal, death, resignation, or inability to do the job."); see also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Constitutional Tangle, NEw REPuBLIC, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14, 15 ("[The] presidency
cannot be conducted from jail, nor can it be effectively carried on while an incumbent is defending
himself in a criminal trial.").
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officials and Supreme Court Justices. 6 But these words sensibly mean
different things in these two contexts. Constitutionally, Cabinet officers
are members of the President's team; Justices are not. 7 Thus, the Senate
historically gives more deference to the President's nominees when
Cabinet officers (who will leave when the President leaves) are at stake,
than when Justices (who will be in place for life) are involved. The
same words--"advise and consent"--must be understood in different
ways when they interact with different clauses with different structural
implications. So too with the Constitution's words concerning im-
peachment.
Let us begin structural analysis by pondering the following hypo-
thetical, which implicates federalism as well as separation of powers:
Could some clever state or county prosecutor in Charleston, South
Carolina have indicted Abraham Lincoln in March 1861, and ordered
him to stand trial in Charleston? If so, there might well be no United
States today bringing us all together. I believe that the Constitution gave
Lincoln immunity in this situation-so long as he was in office." The
President is elected by the whole nation, and no one part of the nation
should have the power to undo a decision of the whole. 9 This is the kind
of structural argument exemplified by Marshall's classic opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland.'
What is true of a state criminal prosecution is also true of a federal
criminal prosecution. Here too, we cannot let a part undo the whole.
Any one federal grand jury or federal petit jury will come from one
city-be it Charleston or Little Rock or the District of Columbia."' The
President is elected by the entire nation, and should be judged by the,
entire nation. His true grand jury is the House, his true petit jury is the
16. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that the President "shall nominate ... with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate ... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States").
17. See Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nomi-
nees, 79 YALE L.. 657, 660 (1970) (discussing how the Cabinet members are the President's
"people" and that "the judges are not the President's people"); see generally Akhil Reed Amar,
Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Trial and
Tribulation, NEW REPUBUC, Jan. 18, 1999, at 17.
18. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 1, at 14-15. The Lincoln hypothetical helps make clear
that: (1) innocent Presidents can be targeted by political opponents; (2) local decision-makers can-
not always be trusted to decide the fate of a sitting President; and (3) the cost to the nation of al-
lowing open season on Presidents can be extraordinary. In particular, Vice Presidents are not al-
ways perfect substitutes. (Pop Quiz: Name Lincoln's Vice President in 1861.)
19. See id. at 15 (commenting that the only body that the President should answer to is "[afll
of the People ofAmerica, through their chosen representatives").
20. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
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Senate, and the true indictment that he is subject to is called an im-
peachment.' What's more, any effort to indict him by an independent
counsel would also violate the Constitution's Article II Appointments
Clause.2 (Let me make clear that Kenneth Starr the man is my friend,
and I admire and respect him. Nothing that I say here should be under-
stood as a personal criticism.) Counsel Starr is, constitutionally speak-
ing, an "inferior" officer.' He was never, as counsel, confirmed by this
body, the Senate of the United States. Were he to claim the power to
indict a sitting President, it would be impossible to argue with a straight
face that he is simply some "inferior" officer. He would be breaking
with the historical and traditional approach of the Justice Depart-
ment-and even if you think he would be right, you cannot say he
would truly be inferior. He would be claiming for himself the power to
imprison the Chief Executive Officer. This power is awesome-it is
anything but an "inferior" power that can be vested in an "inferior" offi-
cer. This issue of course did not arise in the 1988 Supreme Court case,
Morrison v. Olson, 6 since the President in that case was not a target.27
(And remember, Richard Nixon was only named an unindicted co-
conspirator.) Since Morrison, the Court has been even more strict in in-
sisting that the word "inferior" be taken seriously in the Appointments
Clause, as evidenced by the 1997 case Edmond v. United States.2 Any
indictment of the President by Counsel Starr would in my view plainly
violate the teaching of Edmond.29
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (stating that the House of Representatives has the "sole
Power of Impeachment"); id. § 3, cl. 6 (stating that the "Senate shall have the sole power to try all
Impeachments").
23. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24. See id. ("[Tihe Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Supreme Court held the Office of Independent
Counsel was an inferior officer under the appointments clause. See id. at 671. But see Akhil Reed
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 802-12 (1999).
25. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
26. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
27. The targets of the investigation were Theodore B. Olson, Edward C. Schmults, and Carol
E. Dinkins, officials in the Justice Department who were under suspicion of giving false testimony
under oath, among other offenses. See id. at 654-55.
28. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
29. The Court stated that "[g]enerally speaking, the term 'inferior officer' connotes a rela-
tionship [of supervision and direction] with some higher ranking officer or officers below the
President: Whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether or not he has a superior." Id. at
662. For more discussion, see Amar, supra note 24, at 802-12; Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v.
Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 CoLuM. L. REV.
1103, 1117-20 (1998); Erez Kalir, Superior Logic, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 14 & 21, 1998, at 14, 14-
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Let me conclude by making clear that of course no man is above
the law. Once out of office, an ex-President may be tried just like any-
one else-and that day of reckoning can of course be speeded up if the
House and the Senate decide to impeach and remove." Moreover, since
a sitting President's immunity sounds in personal jurisdiction, it may
well be waivable, and if so, political pressure may be brought upon a
President to consent to be tried.3" The question is not whether a Presi-
dent is accountable to law and to the country-but how, when, and by
whom.
30. For discussion of the obvious distinctions between Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681
(1998)-which upheld a civil suit against an unconsenting President-and criminal prosecution of
an unconsenting President, see Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon's Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999); Akhil Reed Amar, In Praise of Impeachment, AM. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 92,
92-94.
31. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 1, at 15, 17. Thus, there may be a difference between in-
dicting a sitting President against his will, and forcing him to stand trial against his will. The for-
mer may be permissible even if the latter is not (bracketing for the moment the serious appoint-
ments clause objections to independent counsels).
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